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Corporate Corruption & the New Gold
Mine
HOW THE DODD-FRANK ACT OVERINCENTIVIZES
WHISTLEBLOWING
INTRODUCTION
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.
filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.1 It
had debts of $613 billion against total assets of $639 billion,
and its bankruptcy filing stands as the largest in the United
States.2 On the following day, the U.S. government seized
control of American International Group (AIG), one of the
world’s largest insurers, in an $85 billion deal that “signaled
the intensity of its concerns about the danger a collapse could
pose to the financial system.”3 Federal Reserve Vice Chairman
Donald Kohn stated that the failure of AIG posed “unacceptably
large” risks to “consumers, municipalities, small business . . . as
well as the risks to the wider economy,” and in essence, provided
a “too big to fail” rationale to support the federal government’s
$85 billion bailout.4 To some, this troubled financial state
represented the “worst economy since the Great Depression.”5
1

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.’s Bankruptcy Information, EPIQ SYS.,
http://chapter11.epiqsystems.com/LBH/Project/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
2
Sam Mamudi, Lehman Folds with Record $613 Billion Debt, MARKET
WATCH (Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/lehman-folds-with-record613-billion-debt?siteid=rss.
3
Matthew Karnitschnig, Deborah Solomon, Liam Pleven & Jon E.
Hilsenrath, U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as
Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A1.
4
Mark Felsenthal, Fed’s Kohn: AIG Too Big to Fail, REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2009),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE52446C20090305. A bank or financial institution is
“too big to fail” when it is so large and interconnected with other financial institutions that
its failure could set off a “chain reaction.” FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF
REPORT: GOVERNMENTAL RESCUES OF “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 2
(2010), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/2010-0831Governmental-Rescues.pdf.
5
See Timothy Geithner, Sec’y, Dep’t of Treasury, Address at Congressional
Hispanic Caucus Institute Conference (Sept. 13, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg849.aspx); Lori Montgomery,
New Economic Face Is Still Familiar, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2010, at A12; Barack
Obama, President, United States, Remarks by the President at a Reception for
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This economic crisis led to widespread support for
changes in the financial regulatory system.6 President Barack
Obama, when commenting on twenty-first-century financial
regulatory reform, stated, “It is indisputable that one of the
most significant contributors to our economic downturn
was . . . the lack of adequate regulatory structures to prevent
abuse and excess.”7 In response to the lack of such regulatory
structures, Democratic Representative Barney Frank and
Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd proposed a
financial regulatory overhaul.8 President Obama signed the
resulting Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) on July 21, 2010.9
The Dodd-Frank Act faced fierce resistance and nearly
unanimous Republican opposition.10 Critics of the Dodd-Frank
Act claim it is a “radical expansion of the federal government
that will hurt small businesses, community banks, and
everyday taxpayers”11 and that the “new and expanded
regulations . . . will limit the ability of banks . . . to extend
credit.”12 Others argue that the Dodd-Frank Act is not strong
Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal (Sept. 16, 2010) (transcript available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/16/remarks-president-a-receptionconnecticut-attorney-general-richard-blume) [hereinafter White House Transcript].
6
Jack Ewing, Financial Regulatory Reform, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/
topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/financial_regulatory_reform/index.html
(last updated July 19, 2011).
7
Barack Obama, President, United States, Remarks by the President on
Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the_press_office/Remarks-of-the-President-on-Regulatory-Reform/) [hereinafter Obama,
Remarks].
8
H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted).
9
See Presidential Statement on Signing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 617 (July 21, 2010)
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-presidentsigning-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act).
10
See Silla Brush, Dodd to Unveil Financial Legislation on Monday; No GOP
Support Expected, HILL (Mar. 14, 2010, 9:25 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/
senate/86677-dodd-to-unveil-financial-legislation-monday-no-gop-support-expected
(reporting that Senator Dodd’s financial regulatory proposals are not expected to have
Republican support); see also Jim Kuhnhenn, Historic Financial Overhaul Signed to
Law by Obama, DAILY CALLER (July 21, 2010, 3:08 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2010/
07/21/obama-poised-to-sign-sweeping-financial-overhaul/ (stating that the law passed
“despite nearly unanimous Republican opposition”).
11
Don Seymour, Dodd-Frank: A Radical Expansion of Government That
Won’t Prevent Future Bailouts, FREEDOM PROJECT (July 16, 2010, 3:35 PM),
http://www.freedomproject.org/blog/dodd-frank-radical-expansion-government-wontprevent-future-bailouts.
12
Ryan Grim, Wall Street Opposes Wall Street Reform, HUFFINGTON POST
(June 28, 2010, 12:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/28/wall-street-opposeswall_n_627870.html (quoting Letter from Am. Bankers Ass’n to Members of Congress,
June 28, 2010).
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enough to revive the nation’s economic health.13 Proponents,
however, praise the Dodd-Frank Act as legislation that “marks
the end of more than a generation in which the prevailing
posture of Washington toward the financial industry was largely
one of hands-off cheering, evidenced by steady deregulation,”
and hail the Act as a “clear turning point, highlighting . . . [a]
renewed reliance on government to protect the little guy.”14
Despite the cloud of political controversy surrounding
the Dodd-Frank Act, President Obama has firmly held that this
overhaul of the financial regulatory system “place[s] rules that
will allow our markets to promote innovation while
discouraging abuse.”15 In an effort to help discourage such
abuse, the Dodd-Frank Act includes a new whistleblower
protection provision and also amends preexisting provisions to
provide significant monetary incentives to potential
whistleblowers.16 The new whistleblower provision drastically
expands preexisting whistleblower legislation, primarily by
expanding the scope of persons prohibited from taking
retaliatory action and the scope of persons protected from
retaliatory action. This note will examine two aspects of the
Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provision: its whistleblower
bounty program and its antiretaliation statute. It argues that
the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provisions overincentivize
whistleblowing by providing excessive and unnecessary
bounties, and by granting expansive whistleblower protection
to too large a scope of individuals. In effect, the Dodd-Frank
Act’s whistleblower laws transform corporate corruption into a
“gold mine”17 by giving individuals the opportunity to reap
enormous benefits from reporting alleged violations.

13

See Gretchen Morgenson, Strong Enough for Tough Stains?, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 2010, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/27/business/
27gret.html (stating that the Dodd-Frank Act “fails completely” in curbing “dangerous
risk taking by institutions and cut[ting] big and interconnected financial entities down
to size,” and that “the nation’s financial industry will still be dominated by a handful of
institutions that are too large, too interconnected and too politically powerful to be
allowed to go bankrupt if they make unwise decisions or make huge wrong-way bets”).
14
Ewing, supra note 6.
15
Obama, Remarks, supra note 7.
16
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1514A(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2011)) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
17
The “gold mine” metaphor incorporated into this note’s title was inspired
by Letter from the Association of Corporate Counsel, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y,
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 15, 2010) (on file with author) (stating that as a result of
the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provisions, “[f]raudulent misconduct, the bane of
good compliance systems, then becomes the gold mine”).
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Part I will discuss the preexisting whistleblower
protection and bounty provisions. Part II will examine the
Dodd-Frank
Act’s
amendments
to
the
preexisting
whistleblower laws, as well as its own antiretaliation statute.
Part III will discuss the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower
bounty program and argue that it is likely to be ineffective in
furthering the Act’s goals of encouraging individuals to report
tips of a “higher quality.”18 Part IV will analyze the Dodd-Frank
Act’s antiretaliation provision in light of judicial interpretation
of similar provisions contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and
argue that Dodd-Frank’s dramatic expansion of the scope of
antiretaliation laws has damaging effects. Finally, Part V will
discuss suggestions and recommendations for the future.
I.

PREEXISTING WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION AND
BOUNTY PROVISIONS

Before the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted, several
statutes already protected whistleblowers “who report[] illegal
or wrongful activities of his employer or fellow employees”19 and
provided for rewarding such informants with bounties. Such
provisions include the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,20 the False
Claims Act,21 the Internal Revenue Code’s whistleblower
provision,22 and the Insider Trading and Securities
Enforcement Act of 1988.23 These statutes, however, only
protect whistleblowers in narrow circumstances and provide
weaker bounty incentives, both of which were imprudently
expanded by Dodd-Frank.
A.

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), employees
who provide information or assist in an investigation regarding
conduct that they reasonably believe is a violation of any rule
of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) or “any provision
of federal law relating to fraud against shareholders”24 are
18

Jessica Holzer & Fawn Johnson, Larger Bounties Spur Surge in Fraud Tips,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2010, at C3 (quoting SEC official Stephen Cohen when writing that
“[t]he goal is not just to get more tips, we want to get more high-quality tips”).
19
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1596 (6th ed. 1990).
20
18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006).
21
31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2006).
22
26 U.S.C. § 7623 (2006).
23
Id.
24
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1).
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protected from discharge, demotion, suspension, harassment,
or any other form of discrimination by their employers.25 A
whistleblower alleging an injury from a discriminatory or
retaliatory act must make a prima facie showing that his
whistleblowing behavior was a “contributing factor” to such
act.26 If the whistleblower-employee prevails in the action, he is
entitled to compensatory relief, including back pay with
interest, reinstatement to the same seniority status the
employee would have had but for the employee’s act of
discrimination, and compensation for any special damages
incurred, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.27
Although SOX protects whistleblowers from retaliation,
it applies only when the whistleblower provides information to,
or the investigation is conducted by, “a federal regulatory
enforcement agency or law,” a congressional committee or
member, or an individual “with supervisory authority over the
employee.”28 SOX is further limited to apply only to publicly
traded companies.29
B.

The False Claims Act

The False Claims Act (FCA) similarly protects
whistleblowers from retaliatory action. It prohibits an
employer from discharging, demoting, suspending, harassing,
or otherwise discriminating against the whistleblowing
25

Id. § 1514A(a).
49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006). See, e.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d
1234, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting the persuasiveness of the EEOC’s guidance that
“any adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to
deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity” is prohibited
(quoting EEOC Compliance Manual Section 8, “Retaliation,” ¶ 8008 (1998))); Collins v.
Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (ruling that a
two-week span between the whistleblower’s complaints of alleged violations and her
termination was sufficient to establish circumstances suggesting that the protected
activity “was a contributing factor to the unfavorable personnel action” for summary
judgment purposes).
27
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(A)-(C). Once a party has established its
entitlement to an award of attorneys’ fees, the court must determine what is
reasonable. Van Asdale v. Int’l Game, Tech., No. 3:04-CV-703-RAM, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 46725, at *21 (D. Nev. Apr. 13, 2010). Under federal law, reasonable attorneys’
fees are generally calculated using the “lodestar” method based on the number of hours
the attorney worked. Id.
28
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(A)-(C).
29
The provision prohibits any company with a class of securities “registered
under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or that is required to file reports
under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 including any subsidiary or
affiliate whose financial information is included in the consolidated financial statements
of such company” from retaliating against an employee. Id. § 1514A(a).
26
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employee.30 Relief for the injured whistleblower includes
reinstatement to the same seniority status that the employee
would have had but for the discrimination, double the amount of
back pay plus interest, and compensation for any special damages
sustained, which also includes reasonable attorneys’ fees.31
In addition to its antiretaliation provision, the FCA
offers a monetary reward to whistleblowers.32 The
whistleblower, however, must initiate the action himself.33 If
the government (through the Department of Justice) elects to
proceed with the complaint, the whistleblower is entitled to 15
to 25 percent of the action’s proceeds or settlement.34 The
ultimate amount of the reward depends on the extent to which
the whistleblower “substantially contributed to the prosecution
of the action.”35 If the government declines to pursue an action
initiated by the whistleblower, then the whistleblower will
have the right to conduct it himself36 and be eligible for a
reward the court deems reasonable (between 25 and 30 percent
of the proceeds of the action).37 In making this determination,
the court must consider the whistleblower’s role in advancing
the case to litigation, as well as the significance of the
information he furnishes.38 Under the FCA, the whistleblower
30

An employee, contractor, or agent is entitled to “all relief to make [him]
whole[,]” if he “is discharged, demoted, suspended . . . or in any other manner discriminated
against in the terms and conditions of employment . . . because of [his] lawful acts . . . in
furtherance of an action under this section . . . .” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2006).
31
Id.
32
Id. § 3730(d).
33
Id. § 3730(b)(1).
34
Id. § 3730(d)(1).
35
Id.
36
Within 60 days after the whistleblower files his report, the Government
will either proceed with the action, in which case the action is to be conducted by the
Government, or notify the court that it declines to take over the action, in which case
the person bringing the action shall have the right to conduct the action. Id.
§ 3730(b)(4).
37
Id. § 3730(d)(2). Some courts have interpreted the False Claims Act’s
whistleblower bounty provision to provide the minimum amount of recovery for
individuals who “substantially and independently contribute to the government’s
recovery.” See, e.g., United States ex rel. Burr v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 882 F. Supp.
166, 168 (M.D. Fla. 1995). If, however, a whistleblower suffers “considerable personal
and professional expense,” he is entitled to recover the full thirty percent. Id. The
courts have further held that the “maximum recovery is reserved for situations where
the [whistleblower] actively and uniquely aids the government in the prosecution of the
case.” Id. Other courts believe that an “important factor in determining whether a
[whistleblower] has actively and uniquely aided the government is if the matter
proceeds all the way through trial.” United States ex rel. Fox v. Nw. Nephrology
Assocs., 87 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1112 (E.D. Wash. 2000). Such courts have held that “[i]t
should be a rare occurrence that the maximum percentage is awarded in a case that
has settled short of trial.” Id.
38
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1).
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may also be rewarded up to 10 percent of the action’s proceeds
even if the court determines that the action was based
primarily on information that has already been made public.39
C.

Internal Revenue Code’s Whistleblower Provision

The Internal Revenue Code’s whistleblower provision
also provides bounties to whistleblowers reporting tax
violations. The provision states that a whistleblower who
furnishes information regarding an employer’s underpayment
of taxes or violations of tax laws40 may receive an award of 15 to
30 percent of the collected proceeds.41 The amount of the
whistleblower’s reward will be determined in light of the extent
to which he “substantially contributed to such action.”42 If the
information provided by the whistleblower is based principally
on public information,43 the whistleblower may receive an
award of up to 10 percent of the collected proceeds or
settlement.44 This determination must take into account the
significance of the whistleblower’s role in contributing to the
action.45 In this respect, the Internal Revenue Code’s
whistleblower incentive system is similar to that of the False
Claims Act.46 The Internal Revenue Code’s whistleblower
provisions, however, are limited in scope and do not apply to
illegal actions by individual taxpayers whose gross annual
income is not more than $200,000 or where the amounts in
dispute do not exceed $2 million.47 In addition, unlike under the

39

Id.
If the Secretary of the Treasury proceeds with an administrative or judicial
action for the underpayment of taxes or a violation of the internal revenue laws based
on information brought by a whistleblower, the whistleblower is entitled to receive a
monetary reward. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2006).
41
The whistleblower shall “receive as an award at least 15 percent but not
more than 30 percent of the collected proceeds . . . resulting from the action (including
any related actions) or from any settlement in response to such action.” Id.
42
Id. There are several factors considered when determining the amount of
the whistleblower’s reward. For instance, the award is reduced where the
whistleblower planned the actions leading to the underpayment of tax. Id. § 7623(b)(3).
43
Id. § 7623(b)(2)(A).
44
Id.
45
The Whistleblower Office is to take into account the “significance of the
individual’s information and the role of such individual and any legal representative of
such individual in contributing to such action.” Id.
46
Under the False Claims Act, the degree to which the whistleblower
contributed to the prosecution of the action is a factor that determines the amount of
the reward. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2006).
47
26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(5).
40
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False Claims Act, the payment of the whistleblower reward
here is discretionary, not mandatory.48
D.

Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act
of 1988

The Insider Trading and Securities Enforcement Act of
1988 (Insider Trading Act) added a whistleblower bounty
provision to the Securities Exchange Act of 193449 that applies
only to insider trading.50 The Insider Trading Act prohibits any
person from purchasing or selling a security while in
possession of material and nonpublic information51 and
mandates an award to whistleblowers of up to 10 percent of the
proceeds of an action brought for any such violation they
helped expose.52
These preexisting whistleblower statutes protect
whistleblowers from employer retaliation, and even provide
monetary rewards to incent whistleblowing. These provisions,
however, protect and reward whistleblowers only in limited
circumstances. For instance, SOX’s whistleblower protection
provision applies only to publicly traded companies,53 and the
48

Courts have held that the whistleblower reward provision in 26 U.S.C
§ 7623(b)(1) is not “money-mandating.” Wilson v. United States, No. 07-191T, 2007 U.S.
Claims LEXIS 268, at *5-6 (Fed. Cl. July 13, 2007). Instead, the provision gives the
Internal Revenue Service the “broad discretion to decide whether to make an award or
how much to grant.” Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also
Schmidt v. IRS, No. 08-10037, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39376, at *3-4 (E.D. Mich. May 15,
2008) (concluding that an award under the Internal Revenue Code’s whistleblower
provision is discretionary unless there have been negotiations with the whistleblower,
and the whistleblower entered into an explicit agreement on the amount of the award
with the Internal Revenue Service); Conner v. United States, No. 06-655C, 2007 U.S.
Claims LEXIS 104, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 28, 2007) (holding that the statute only gives the
Internal Revenue Status “broad discretion” to determine whether to make an award);
Destefano v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 291, 293 (2002) (stating that the Internal Revenue
Code’s whistleblower reward provision is a “discretionary statute” that does “not mandate
monetary rewards and consequently do[es] not create a substantive right to money
damages”); Krug v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 96, 97 (1998) (ruling that the Internal
Revenue Service is not obligated to reward informants).
49
Insider Trading Act and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677.
50
Id. § 21A, 102 Stat. at 4677-78.
51
Id.
52
“[T]here shall be paid from amounts imposed as a penalty . . . such sums,
not to exceed 10 percent of such amounts, as the [SEC] deems appropriate, to the
person or persons who provide information leading to the imposition of such penalty.”
Id. § 21A(e), 102 Stat. at 4679.
53
The provision prohibits any company with a class of securities “registered
under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or that is required to file
reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934” from retaliating
against an employee. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2006).
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Internal Revenue Code’s whistleblower bounty program applies
to an individual only if the disputed amount exceeds $2
million.54 Further, such rewards are not mandatory.55 Although
bounties under the False Claims Act are mandated, the
whistleblower himself must initiate the action,56 thereby saving
the government from administrative expenses. The DoddFrank Act’s whistleblower provisions, however, largely
eliminate these limitations and drastically expand the
applicability of whistleblower laws.
II.

WHISTLEBLOWER INCENTIVES AND PROTECTION UNDER
THE DODD-FRANK ACT

The Dodd-Frank Act greatly expands preexisting
whistleblower bounty and antiretaliation provisions. It amends
the SEC’s whistleblower provision by expanding its scope to
cases other than those involving insider trading.57 The newly
amended whistleblower provision now applies to any violation of
securities laws and prohibits employers from discharging,
demoting, suspending, threatening, or otherwise discriminating
against a whistleblower.58 The provision also expands the
definition of a whistleblower, which is now defined as an
individual, or two or more individuals acting jointly, who provide
information “relating to a violation of the securities laws.”59
The Dodd-Frank Act also incentivizes whistleblowing by
mandating a monetary reward to informants who provide
“original information” regarding illegal activity.60 The provision
54
55
56
57
58

26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(5)(B) (2006).
See supra note 48.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2006).
See 15. U.S.C.A. § 78u-6 (West 2001 & Supp. 2011).
Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). The provision reads:

No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or
indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower in
the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by
the whistleblower (i) in providing information to the [SEC] in accordance
with this section; (ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any
investigation or judicial or administrative action of the [SEC] based upon or
related to such information; or (iii) in making disclosures that are required or
protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.), including section
10A(m) of such Act (15 U.S.C. 78f(m)), section 1513(e) of title 18, United
States Code, and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction
of the [SEC].
Id.
59
60

Id. § 78u-6(a)(6).
Id. § 78u-6(b)(1).
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defines “original information” as information that is derived
from the
independent knowledge or analysis of a whistleblower; is not known
to the Commission from any other source, unless the whistleblower
is the original source of the information; and is not exclusively
derived from an allegation made in a judicial or administrative
hearing, in a governmental report, hearing, audit or investigation, or
from the news media, unless the whistleblower is a source of the
information.61

Further, the Act expands the type of person that can be a
whistleblower. For instance, a whistleblower is not required to
be an employee to receive the reward.62 In order to be eligible
for a reward, however, the information furnished by the
whistleblower must result in sanctions exceeding $1 million.63
Thus, if the whistleblower qualifies for the reward, he is
guaranteed to receive a payment of at least 10 percent of $1
million, or $100,000. Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act inserts
a nearly identical whistleblower bounty provision into the
Commodity Exchange Act.64
Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act also expands the
types of companies these provisions apply to by amending
Unamended,
SOX’s
SOX’s
whistleblower
provision.65
antiretaliation statute applied only to publicly traded
companies.66 Under the Dodd-Frank Act amendments, however,
now any “subsidiary or affiliate whose financial information is
included in the consolidated financial statements of such
company”67 is within the purview of SOX’s whistleblower
protection provision.
Although the Dodd-Frank Act makes significant
changes in preexisting whistleblower statutes, section 1057 of
the Act most notably creates a broad private right of action for
employees in the financial services industry who are retaliated
61

Id. § 78u-6(a)(3).
A “whistleblower” is defined as “any individual who provides . . . information
relating to a violation of securities laws to the [SEC].” Id. § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added).
63
Under section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a whistleblower
is to be rewarded only in a “covered judicial or administrative action.” Id. § 78u-6(b)(1).
A “covered judicial or administrative action,” in turn, is defined as one that results in
monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 748(a)(1), 922(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841, 1842 (2010) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2011)).
64
7 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
65
Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841.
66
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2006).
67
Dodd-Frank Act § 929A, 124 Stat. at 1852.
62
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against for disclosing information regarding a violation of the
Dodd-Frank Act, or any other provision that is subject to the
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau).68
Under section 1057, “covered employees”69 are protected
from retaliation if they engage in certain protected activities.70
A covered employee is any individual who performs “tasks
related to the offering or provision of a consumer financial
product or service,”71 or an authorized representative of such an
individual.72 An employer (or any affiliate of such employer if
the affiliate is a service provider) engaged in the offering or
provision of a “consumer financial product or service” cannot
discriminate against the whistleblower-employee, or cause the
whistleblower-employee to be discriminated against.73 The
complainant has the burden of making a prima facie showing
that his disclosure of information was a contributing factor to
the alleged retaliatory action.74 But if the employer
demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that he would
have taken the same unfavorable personnel action even in the
absence of that behavior, then the complainant is not entitled
to any relief.75 If it is ultimately determined that the
whistleblower was the victim of discrimination in violation of
section 1057, he is entitled to reinstatement to his former
position, as well as compensatory damages.76

68

Id. § 1057, 124 Stat. at 2031. Section 1011 of the Dodd-Frank Act
establishes an independent executive agency called the “Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection.” The Bureau is to “regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial
products or services under the Federal consumer financial laws.” Id. § 1011(a), 124
Stat. at 1964.
69
The Dodd-Frank Act prohibits an employer’s retaliatory action against
“any covered employee or any authorized representative of covered employees.” Id.
§ 1057(a), 124 Stat. at 2031.
70
A whistleblower’s protected activity includes providing information to the
employer or any government authority relating to any violation of any law that is
subject to the Bureau’s jurisdiction, as well as “testify[ing] . . . in any proceeding
resulting from the . . . enforcement of any . . . law that is subject to the [Bureau’s
jurisdiction] . . . or object[ing] to . . . any activity . . . that the employee . . . reasonably
believed to be a violation of any law . . . subject to the [Bureau’s jurisdiction].” Id.
§ 1057(a)(1)-(4), 124 Stat. at 2031-32.
71
Id. § 1057(b), 124 Stat. at 2032.
72
The Dodd-Frank Act prohibits a covered person or service provider from
discriminating against “any covered employee or any authorized representative of
covered employees” for reporting a violation. Id. § 1057(a), 124 Stat. at 2031.
73
Id. §§ 1002(6), 1057(a), 124 Stat. at 1961, 2031.
74
Id. § 1057(c)(3)(A), 124 Stat. at 2033.
75
Id. § 1057(c)(3)(C), 124 Stat. at 2033. Note that these standards of proof
are essentially identical to those governing whistleblower retaliation claims brought
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See supra Part I.A.
76
Dodd-Frank Act § 1057(c)(4)(B), 124 Stat. at 2033.
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Section 1057 of the Dodd-Frank Act as well as the Act’s
amendments to preexisting whistleblower laws dramatically
expands the scope of liability under antiretaliation provisions.
The SEC’s whistleblower program now extends to cases other
than insider trading, and whistleblowers engaged in the
consumer financial product or service industries are offered
expansive protection from retaliation or discrimination.77 The
Dodd-Frank Act also creates generous bounty programs offering
large monetary rewards to qualifying whistleblowers in efforts to
encourage individuals to report violations.78 However, the
effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provisions is
doubtful, and likely overincentivizes whistleblowing.
III.

THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT’S
WHISTLEBLOWER BOUNTY PROGRAM

Despite legislators’ good intentions, the Dodd-Frank
Act’s bounty program overincentivizes whistleblowing and will
waste administrative resources because it provides what
studies show are unnecessarily excessive awards. Although the
bounty program was enacted to encourage whistleblowing, the
monetary rewards are likely unnecessary in advancing the
provision’s purported goals. Further, the bounty provisions lack
significant threshold considerations and fail to discourage the
submission of frivolous claims. As a result, whistleblowers are
overincentivized.
A.

Goals of the Dodd-Frank Act’s Whistleblower Bounty
Program

The legislative history of the Dodd-Frank Act reveals
Congress’s intent “to motivate those with inside knowledge to
come forward and assist the Government to identify and
prosecute persons who have violated securities laws and
recover money for victims of financial fraud.”79 Congress
emphasized the importance of bounty programs because
whistleblowers “often face the difficult choice between telling
the truth and the risk of committing ‘career suicide.’”80 Harry
77

See infra Part IV.
The program “[r]ecogniz[es] that whistleblowers often face the difficult
choice between telling the truth and the risk of committing ‘career suicide.’” S. REP. NO.
111-176, at 110 (2010).
79
Id.
80
Id.
78
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Markopolos,
Certified
Fraud
Examiner
and
Madoff
whistleblower, attested to the efficiency and effectiveness of
whistleblower bounty programs. He cited statistics holding that
whistleblower tips uncovered 54 percent of fraud schemes in
public companies, as opposed to the 4 percent that external
auditors—including the SEC—exposed.81 SEC Chairman Mary
L. Schapiro further noted that “[w]histleblowers can be a source
of valuable firsthand information that may otherwise not come
to light”82 and that “[t]hese high-quality leads can be crucial to
protecting investors and recovering ill-gotten gains from
wrongdoers.”83 Congress has made it abundantly clear that one
of the primary purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower
bounty program is to encourage the reporting of “high-quality”
tips,84 and the $1 million requirement that whistleblowers must
meet in order to qualify for a reward evidences legislators’
efforts to encourage the disclosure of major violations. Although
it may seem logical that providing monetary rewards
incentivizes whistleblowers to report illegal activity, studies
show that this assumption is not entirely true. In fact, in light of
recent research, the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower bounty
program is counterproductive.
B.

Research Indicating the Ineffectiveness of the DoddFrank Act’s Whistleblower Bounty Program

A recent study demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the
Dodd-Frank Act’s bounty program. The study examined the role
incentives play in whistleblowers’ decisions to report illegal
activity.85 It concluded that in cases where the whistleblower has
a “greater ethical stake in the outcome” monetary incentives
might be unnecessary and counterproductive because they may
offset the whistleblower’s internal ethical motivation.86
Conversely, when the perceived severity of the misconduct is
81

See Assessing the Madoff Ponzi Scheme and Regulatory Failures: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Harry Markopolos).
82
Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes New Whistleblower
Program Under Dodd-Frank Act (Nov. 3, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2010/2010-213.htm.
83
Id.
84
Holzer & Johnson, supra note 18.
85
See generally Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The
Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties and Protections for Reporting
Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151 (2010).
86
Id. at 1207.
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low, “external incentives,” such as monetary rewards, “matter
much more” to the whistleblower’s decision to report the
illegality.87 In other words, in cases where the activity at issue
has significant ethical and moral implications, research
suggests that the whistleblower does not need monetary
incentives to compel him to report the violation. On the other
hand, situations involving less severe conduct may require
financial rewards to encourage the whistleblower to report the
misconduct. These results are “contrary to the basic intuition of
the legal policy maker to give higher rewards as the
misconduct is more severe.”88 Given its legislative intent to
encourage the reporting of major violations, the Dodd-Frank
Act’s whistleblower bounty program is likely to be
counterproductive, as it offers large monetary rewards, which
studies indicate are unnecessary for cases involving significant
moral implications.89 Other studies show that “extrinsic
motivators do not alter the attitudes that underlie our
behaviors. They do not create an enduring commitment to any
value or action.”90 Thus, it is unlikely that the Dodd-Frank Act’s
whistleblower bounty program will be successful in furthering
legislators’ goals. The Dodd-Frank Act also lacks significant
thresholds that the whistleblower must overcome, which is
likely to result in a surge of reports of trivial claims.
1. The Ineffectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act’s Large
Monetary Rewards
The general perception regarding the relationship
between the amount of sanctions imposed and the severity of
misconduct is that the greater the amount of sanctions, the
more severe the misconduct.91 Thus, through the Dodd-Frank
Act’s imposition of the $1 million minimum, the legislature
appears to intend to reward whistleblowers only in cases where
the severity of misconduct and moral offensiveness is high. The
study generally found that “[i]n areas where the misconduct is
expected to trigger high internal motivation, there is less need
87
88
89
90

Id. at 1194.
Id. at 1204.
See id.
Alfie Kohn, Why Incentive Plans Cannot Work, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct.

1993, at 55.
91

Feldman & Lobel, supra note 85, at 1204 (stating that “legal policy
maker[s] give higher rewards as the misconduct is more severe (given its likely
correlation with greater harm to society)”).
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to invest in incentive mechanisms.”92 The Dodd-Frank Act’s
bounty program appears to contradict this research, as it
guarantees a qualifying whistleblower a minimum reward of
$100,000 for a tip regarding a violation worthy of sanctions of
at least $1 million.93 Consequently, the Dodd-Frank Act’s
bounty program is excessive, as it offers monetary incentives
that studies show are not necessary.
The large rewards offered to whistleblowers
overincentivize whistleblowing, and may ultimately prove to be
a waste of limited agency resources. This is not to suggest that
all whistleblower bounty programs should be eliminated. Due
to its inherent risks,94 whistleblowing, to some extent, should be
incentivized through regulatory policies that “encourage
individuals to break the code of silence in corrupt
organizations.”95 Eliminating all whistleblower bounty
provisions and instead implementing a legal duty to report,
along with a fine for a failure to report, is unlikely to be
effective in encouraging whistleblowing, as there is a “growing
body of studies both in social psychology and in behavioral
economics indicating that people respond more strongly to
incentives than penalties.”96 However, monetary incentives may
not be necessary or effective in all situations, and thus it is
imperative that legislators accurately assess and determine the
optimal level of rewards to ensure the effective application of
limited agency resources.97 Although the Dodd-Frank Act’s
whistleblower bounty program attempts to achieve this ideal
level of whistleblower incentives, it fails to do so. By
mandating large rewards to whistleblowers, the Dodd-Frank
Act’s whistleblower provision invites a flood of whistleblower
reports, which may not necessarily be of the “high-quality”
92

Id.
Under section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act, a whistleblower is to
receive a minimum of ten percent of the sanctions recovered, which must be at least
$1,000,000, resulting in a minimum recovery of $100,000. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a)-(b)(1)
(West 2009 & Supp. 2011). The law further provides that a “covered judicial or
administrative action” is an action that “results in monetary sanctions exceeding
$1,000,000.” Id. § 78u-6(a)(1).
94
See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 85, at 1157-58 (“The decision of whether
to blow the whistle is a complex one and inevitably involves certain risks. . . . In
addition to direct employment retaliation, reporting often entails psychological and
societal costs, including fear, guilt and mistreatment by peers and community. . . . One
commentator has described whistle-blowing as ‘professional suicide.’” (quoting James
Gobert & Maurice Punch, Whistleblowers, the Public Interest, and the Public Interest
Disclosure Act 1998, 63 MOD. L. REV. 25, 35 (2000))).
95
Id. at 1159.
96
Id. at 1181.
97
See id. at 1182.
93
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legislators intended to encourage.98 Although some
whistleblowers may be discouraged from bringing such claims
forward because of fear of retaliation, in light of the expansive
protection granted by the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower
protection provisions, this ultimately may not prove to be a
significant disincentive.99
2. The Dodd-Frank Act’s Lack of Significant Threshold
Considerations
The excessive rewards provided by the Dodd-Frank Act
could be justifiable if there were meaningful thresholds the
whistleblower had to overcome in order to receive his reward.
Threshold considerations involve what the whistleblower must
first do and what the result of the disclosures must be in order to
qualify for a reward.100 For example, the FCA contains significant
threshold considerations101—namely, the whistleblower must
initiate the litigation himself.102 As a result of this prerequisite,
whistleblowers may be discouraged from reporting frivolous
claims.103 Such meaningful threshold considerations are absent
in the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower bounty provisions.
For instance, the Dodd-Frank Act does not contain
significant threshold considerations with respect to who can
benefit from its provisions. In fact, the whistleblower does not
even need to be an employee of the entity allegedly engaging in
the illegal activity.104 Although the whistleblower must provide
information that is not known to the agency from another

98

Holzer & Johnson, supra note 18.
See discussion supra Part II; see also Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G.
Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty
Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141, 1173-74 (“Although an informant’s discounted
losses can arise in many ways, the ‘big ticket’ potential harms are harm to her
livelihood . . . . In this vein, discounted retaliation costs arise from a host of actions a
defendant could take against the informant . . . .”). However, federal and state
antiretaliation statutes protect the whistleblower, and “[a]lthough an informant may
not find his former workplace a pleasant post-informing environment, these statutes
can ensure that he remains gainfully employed or receives compensation for any harm
suffered in the workplace, thus mitigating his discounted retaliation losses.” Id. at
1174. Such discounted losses may also include “reputational harms and the mental and
emotional costs of testifying in litigation.” Id.
100
Id. at 1150.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 1159.
104
15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a)(6) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011).
99
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source,105 thus overcoming a threshold requirement concerning
the type of information covered under the Act, this may not
ultimately prove to be a difficult standard to overcome as
whistleblowers can race to furnish the agencies with their
inside information. Another arguable “threshold” contained in
the Dodd-Frank Act is the $1 million requirement whistleblowers
must satisfy in order to be eligible for a reward.106 Although this
million-dollar minimum does provide some limitation on the
whistleblower’s eligibility for the bounty, there is no provision
preventing the whistleblower from reporting frivolous claims in
hopes that the sanctions exceed $1 million.107 Additionally,
whistleblowers do not need to demonstrate the veracity of their
allegations. Under the finalized rules, the whistleblower submits
his or her information regarding potential securities law
violations under the penalty of perjury.108 However, “there is little
to deter individuals from making unjustified accusations of
wrongdoing,”109 and the possibility that a whistleblower will
provide a knowingly false statement that could be the basis for
prosecution of perjury110 is “remote at best.”111
Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provisions
lack significant threshold considerations and fail to discourage
whistleblowers from reporting trivial claims. The Act also
offers excessive monetary rewards, and as a result,
overincentivizes whistleblowing.
105

Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 748(a)(4)(B), 922(a)(3)(B), 124
Stat. 1376, 1740, 1842 (2010) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a) (West
2000 & Supp. 2011)).
106
A whistleblower is rewarded only in a “covered judicial or administrative
action,” 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(b)(1), which is defined as an action that results in
monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 748(a)(1), 922(a)(1), 124
Stat. at 1841, 1842.
107
Bruce Carton, Pitfalls Emerge in Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Bounty
Provision, SEC. DOCKET (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2010/09/
09/pitfalls-emerge-in-dodd-frank-whistleblower-bounty-provision/ (noting that “[t]he
millions that whistleblowers might potentially reap could also encourage a lottery
mentality, where people file complaints on weak or wholly illegitimate claims ‘just in
case.’”). However, there is a provision that penalizes the whistleblower for willfully
furnishing false information. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 748(m), 922(i), 124 Stat. at 1746, 1847.
108
Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545, 76 Fed. Reg.
34,300 (May 25, 2011) [hereinafter SEC Final Rules]; see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(i).
109
Letter from Jones Day, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n (Dec. 17, 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter Jones Day Letter].
110
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2006), any person who “knowingly and willfully
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up . . . a material fact; (2) makes any
materially . . . fraudulent statement or representation; or (3) makes or uses any false
writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially . . . fraudulent
statement . . . will be fined and imprisoned for not more than 5 years.” Id.
111
Jones Day Letter, supra note 109.
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Future Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act’s
Whistleblower Bounty Program

The excessive rewards provided by the Dodd-Frank Act’s
whistleblower bounty program, as well as its lack of significant
threshold considerations, is likely to have several implications,
including an increase in the number of whistleblower claims, a
burden on administrative costs, and employees’ circumvention of
companies’ internal compliance systems.
1. Substantial Increase in the Number of Whistleblower
Claims
Expected bounty payments are one of the most
important factors that influence whistleblowers’ decisions to
disclose a violation.112 In fact, “[m]uch of the [whistleblower’s]
uncertainty [is attributed to] the agency’s discretion to award a
reduced bounty or no bounty at all.”113 Under the Dodd-Frank
Act, a whistleblower’s uncertainty regarding payment is largely
eliminated. Provided that his information results in sanctions
exceeding $1 million, the whistleblower is certain that he will
receive a reward of at least $100,000. But if monetary rewards
are high, “every potential informant with a crumb of
information might crawl out of the woodwork hoping to hit the
bounty jackpot.”114 In fact, claims began “trickling in” shortly
after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.115 Although “no
flood of tips” has occurred yet since the SEC finalized the
whistleblower provisions,116 Sean McKessy, head of the
Whistleblower Office, is expanding his staff117 and the SEC
predicts it will receive approximately thirty-thousand tips per
year.118 Further, it is likely that a SEC announcement of a large

112

Ferziger & Currell, supra note 99, at 1152.
Id.
Id.
115
Jean Eaglesham & Ashby Jones, Whistleblower Bounties Pose Challenges,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704058704
576015210866784294.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection.
116
Andrea Shalal-Esa, US SEC Says Will Fix Whistleblower Rule if Any
Problems, REUTERS (Aug. 11, 2011, 6:34 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/
08/11/sec-whistleblowers-idUSN1E77A1YH20110811.
117
See id.
118
Eaglesham & Jones, supra note 115.
113
114
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reward arising from a Dodd-Frank whistleblower initiative will
trigger an increased number of claims.119
Due to the Act’s lack of significant threshold
considerations,120 whistleblowers may rush to report alleged
violations without confirming that the allegations are valid in
order to ensure that they are the original source of information.
Ultimately, the unnecessary payments the whistleblower
receives is likely to be ineffective in furthering the Dodd-Frank
Act’s goal of soliciting “high quality” tips. Instead, the DoddFrank Act’s whistleblower bounty program overincentivizes
whistleblowing, and is likely to lead to a surge of reports and a
burden on administrative costs.
2. Burden on Administrative Costs
Whistleblower bounty programs may ostensibly lower
the cost of obtaining vital information, but the Dodd-Frank Act
will not ultimately save administrative resources.121 A reduction
in administrative costs may result if the statute contained
meaningful threshold considerations, such as in the False
Claims Act, which permits private individuals to bring the suit
on behalf of the government.122 However, the administration
under the Dodd-Frank Act will have to “review—and
occasionally litigate—a substantial number of claims that turn
out to be grounded on poor information or information the
[agency] or the public already possessed.”123 Unlike the False
Claims Act, where the government does not conduct most of the
litigation,124 the administration under the Dodd-Frank Act will
have to devote further resources to investigate the alleged
misconduct. Additionally, given the likelihood that the DoddFrank Act will result in a drastically increased amount of
whistleblower reports, agencies will expend additional “time
and resources when sorting good tips from the bad.”125 The
119

Doug Clark, Opening the Floodgates: The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions’
Impact on Corporate America, BOARDMEMBER.COM, http://www.boardmember.com/Article_
Details.aspx?id=5642&page=1 (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).
120
See supra Part III.B.2.
121
Ferziger & Currell, supra note 99, at 1158-59.
122
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2006).
123
Ferziger & Currell, supra note 99, at 1159.
124
Id. “Of the first four hundred [False Claims Act] cases filed, the
Department of Justice . . . joined as a litigant in only seventy; the others proceeded
privately.” Id.
125
Id. at 1171. Aside from its practical consequences, implementing
whistleblower incentive programs also has several ethical implications, and the
morality of the practice of rewarding informants has been disputed. Id. at 1191. The
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administrative cost of processing these voluminous reports may
exceed the benefit gained from enticing a few whistleblowers
holding excellent information on high-level crimes.126 The rules
provide that whistleblowers who wish to participate in the
whistleblower program must “declare, under penalty of perjury,
that their submission is truthful to the best of their knowledge.”127
Thus, the SEC argues, the whistleblower rules sufficiently
discourage frivolous claims.128 It reasons that “[t]his should reduce
the costs incurred by the [SEC] from devoting resources to review
and evaluate frivolous submissions, and also create efficiency
gains by permitting the [SEC] to place greater reliance on the
accuracy of information that is received.”129 But the rules lack
threshold considerations that prevent whistleblowers from
reporting claims in hopes that they will result in sanctions
exceeding $1 million.130 As a result, while their submissions may
not be perjurious, they may not be of the high qualify sought by
legislators when drafting the Dodd-Frank Act.
Although the Internal Revenue Code’s whistleblower
bounty program was profitable before its 2006 amendment,131 it
is important to note that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
did not pay whistleblowers the maximum reward of 15
percent.132 In fact, in 1993, the IRS paid an average reward of 3
percent of resulting sanctions.133 Data further indicate that the
IRS “not only pa[id] small percentages and small rewards but
also pa[id] them to a small number of claimants.”134 Thus, it is
general opinion is that informants should voluntarily come forward with information,
rather than being “brib[ed]” to disclose any illegal activity. Id. at 1192. One U.S.
District Court Judge noted, “I don’t think that turkeys like that ought to receive a dime
of my money.” Id. at 1191 (quoting Judge Alcee Hastings). Others, however, do not find
such whistleblower incentives as immoral. Id. at 1192. Some view such programs as
“right and honorable,” and hold the viewpoint that whistleblowers are protecting the
public. Id. Although such moral issues present an interesting debate, it is beyond the
scope of this note.
126
Id. at 1152.
127
SEC Final Rules, supra note 108, at 219.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
See infra Part V.A.
131
In 1967, the IRS paid $723,995 to whistleblowers whose tips led to a $10
million collection of tax revenue. In 1977, it recovered $14,602,341 in unpaid tax
revenue and paid $360,304 in whistleblower rewards. In 1993, the Treasury recovered
$173 million and whistleblower rewards totaled over $5 million. Ferziger & Currell,
supra note 99, at 1166-67.
132
Id. at 1167.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 1168. Although data indicates that the unamended version of the
SEC’s whistleblower program also turns an annual profit, id. at 1167, Ferziger and
Currell note that “statistics on the SEC’s bounty provisions are largely meaningless
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not unreasonable to posit that the Internal Revenue Code’s
previous profits are attributable, at least in part, to its small
and infrequent payouts. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, however,
agencies must reward qualifying whistleblowers at least 10
percent of the resulting sanctions.135 As a result, it is
questionable whether Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower program
will turn a similar profit.136
Interestingly, the IRS paid its first whistleblower reward
in 2011, four years after the enactment of its whistleblower
bounty program.137 Further, the IRS recently reported that it
would delay payments under its pre-amendment program for up
to two years.138 According to the Treasury Department’s
Inspector General for Tax Administration, the IRS’s
whistleblower program suffered from defects in the “control and
timely resolution of whistleblower claims.”139 In light of the
shortcomings of preexisting whistleblower bounty programs, it is
likely that the Dodd-Frank Act’s bounty program will also be
ineffective in furthering the Act’s purported goals.
3. Eradication of Companies’ Internal Compliance
Systems
The Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower program is also
likely to undermine companies’ established internal compliance
systems. Rather than reporting alleged illegal activity to the
company itself, potential whistleblowers may opt to forgo
internal compliance methods and report the misconduct
directly to the SEC. The National Association of Corporate
Directors (NACD) recently argued to the SEC that the DoddFrank Act’s whistleblower provision “encourage[s] employees to
bypass their own [company’s] compliance departments in their

given the extremely low number of claims and payouts in the ten-year history of SEC
bounties.” Id. at 1170.
135
15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(b)(1)(A) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011).
136
In fact, the SEC has delayed the opening of its whistleblower office due to
budgeting concerns. Eaglesham & Jones, supra note 115.
137
Ashby Jones, After Four Years, the IRS (Finally!) Makes a Whistleblower
Payment, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Apr. 8, 2011, 11:44 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
law/2011/04/08/after-four-years-the-irs-finally-makes-a-whistleblower-payment. As of
December 15, 2010, the IRS had not paid any whistleblower rewards. Ryan J.
Donmoyer, IRS Paid No Rewards in U.S. Whistleblower Program, BLOOMBERG (Dec.
15, 2010, 5:29 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-15/irs-paid-no-rewards-toinformants-in-u-s-whistleblower-program.html.
138
Donmoyer, supra note 137.
139
Eaglesham & Jones, supra note 115.
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eagerness to inform the SEC of suspected foul play.”140 It is
inappropriate for such SEC investigations to be conducted at
taxpayer expense,141 and instead, the company should be
afforded an opportunity to remedy the alleged violation.
Bypassing internal compliance essentially denies management
the opportunity to take remedial action because of the
whistleblower’s pursuit of a profit. As a result, the Dodd-Frank
Act vitiates companies’ responsible efforts to create and
implement effective compliance systems and reporting
schemes.142
In an attempt to mitigate the subversion of internal
compliance programs, the SEC now offers a potentially larger
reward if a whistleblower first utilizes the company’s
compliance program before reporting the alleged violation to
the SEC.143 The SEC does this in several ways. For instance, if a
whistleblower first reports the alleged misconduct to the
company’s internal compliance program and the company later
investigates and reports the results of its investigation to the
SEC, all the information provided to the SEC by the company
will be attributed to the whistleblower,144 which can lead to an
increased reward. Additionally, the rules expressly state that a
whistleblower’s participation in his or her company’s internal
compliance program is a factor that can increase his or her
reward.145 Thus, this arguably remedies the issue of the
eradication of companies’ internal compliance programs.146
140

Crossman, supra note 17. The NACD also argued that the whistleblower
program “‘provide[s] an incentive for persons having “independent knowledge” of possible
corporate wrongdoing to report directly to the SEC,’” and that “‘the legislators who
enacted the original provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 did not weigh the consequences the provisions could have on the
ethical and compliance-based cultures of corporations.’” Id. (quoting the NACD).
141
Id.
142
Eaglesham & Jones, supra note 115 (quoting Susan Hackett, Senior Vice
President of the Association of Corporate Counsel, who stated that “[t]he proposals cut to
the very core of what it is that every responsible U.S. company has been trying to do for the
last couple of decades, which is to create effective, robust compliance reporting systems”).
143
Memorandum from Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP 3 (May 26, 2011),
available
at
http://www.cgsh.com/files/News/af83e39a-f0df-442e-8e78-1f05c1bc4a54/
Presentation/NewsAttachment/b281f060-f24c-42b6-8248-23990d2aca9a/CGSH%20Alert
%20-%20SEC%20Approves%20New%20Whistleblower%20Program.pdf (“Despite controversy
and numerous comments from the business community, the final rules do not require
whistleblowers to avail themselves of internal compliance programs before reporting to the
SEC. Instead, the [SEC] made several changes to its proposal to add incentives for
whistleblowers to use internal compliance programs before or when going to the [SEC].”).
144
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(c) (2010).
145
Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(4).
146
The SEC states that although it did not require whistleblowers to report
violations internally, it has “made additional changes to the rules to further incentivize
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However, it is unclear whether increased monetary rewards will
be effective in encouraging whistleblowers to first report alleged
violations internally. First, as noted above,147 studies indicate
that large monetary rewards offset internal motivations, and
may prove to be unnecessary and counterproductive.148 Further,
in light of the court’s interpretation in Egan v. Tradingscreen,
Inc.,149 whistleblowers are likely to bypass the internal
compliance system despite the increased reward.
Egan is the first reported decision under the DoddFrank Act’s whistleblower protection provision,150 and concerns
a “major issue addressed as part of the Dodd-Frank
whistleblower rulemaking proceedings: the integrity of
corporate internal compliance and reporting programs.”151 In
Egan, the whistleblower-employee reported suspected
fraudulent activity to the company’s internal compliance
system.152 Despite assurances that he would not be fired, he was
later terminated and thus filed suit, alleging a violation of the
Dodd-Frank Act’s antiretaliation provision.153 The employer
argued that the antiretaliation provisions did not apply
because the whistleblower-employee did not directly report the
alleged violation to the SEC.154 The court interpreted the
whistleblower protection provisions as follows:
Plaintiff must either allege that his information was reported to the
[SEC], or that his disclosures fell under the four categories of
disclosure delineated by 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) that do not
require such reporting: those under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the
Securities Exchange Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e), or other laws and
regulations subject to the jurisdiction of the [SEC].155

The Egan Court reasoned that the legislature could
have easily provided broader protection for whistleblowers
whistleblowers to utilize their companies’ internal compliance and reporting systems
when appropriate.” SEC Final Rules, supra note 108, at 5.
147
See supra Part III.B.
148
See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 85, at 1154-55.
149
No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47713, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y.
May 4, 2011).
150
Letter from Stephen M. Kohn, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Whistleblowers Ctr., to
Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, and David A. Stawick, Sec’y,
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, at 1 (May 17, 2011) (on file with author)
[hereinafter National Whistleblowers Center Letter].
151
Id.
152
Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
47713, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
153
Id. at *5-6.
154
Id. at *9.
155
Id. at *13-14.

326

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

alleging securities laws and thus the “absence of similarly
broad protections . . . indicates that Congress intended to
encourage whistleblowers reporting such violations to report to
the SEC.”156 As such, the court’s interpretation can be read to
mean that “employees have no choice but to bypass internal
reporting systems and directly raise concerns regarding
violations of securities laws with federal regulatory agencies
and the Justice Department.”157 In light of the court’s
interpretation, the possibility of an increased monetary reward
for using internal compliance systems does not outweigh
whistleblowers’ concern of retaliation, and thus they are likely
to report directly to the SEC. In fact, some organizations assert
that they “will do everything in their power to ensure that
employees bypass such channels . . . . [as i]t would be the
height of irresponsibility for whistleblower advocates to urge
employees to use internal reporting programs.”158As a result,
the important policy objectives identified by the SEC would be
“seriously undermined.”159 The Egan Court further noted that
“[o]bviously, a whistleblower must directly report to the SEC to
receive a bounty award from the SEC.”160 Consequently, the
requirement that a whistleblower must report the alleged
violation to the SEC in order to receive the reward, along with
the confusion about whether whistleblowers must report to the
SEC in order to receive protection under the Dodd-Frank Act’s
antiretaliation provisions, is likely to lead to the eradication of
internal compliance programs. Thus, the SEC’s attempt to
encourage whistleblowers to first use companies’ internal
compliance systems by offering larger rewards is ineffective.
The Dodd-Frank Act’s excessive bounties and lack of
significant threshold considerations invite a flood of whistleblower
reports. Supporters may argue that such monetary incentives are
necessary, as whistleblowers are unwilling to report violations for
fear of retaliation or discrimination by their employer. But the
Dodd-Frank Act also offers expansive protection under its
antiretaliation statute, largely reducing such fears. As a result,
the Dodd-Frank Act’s unnecessary and excessive bounty program,
coupled with its expansive antiretaliation protection,

156
157
158
159
160

Id. at *12.
National Whistleblowers Center Letter, supra note 150, at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 2.
Egan, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47713, at *24.
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overincentivizes whistleblowing and is likely to lead to the waste
of administrative resources.
IV.

THE DODD-FRANK ACT’S EXPANSION OF PREEXISTING
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROVISIONS

The Dodd-Frank Act’s antiretaliation provisions
drastically expand preexisting laws in two respects: first, by
expanding the scope of persons prohibited from taking
retaliatory action, and second, by enlarging the scope of
persons protected from retaliatory action.
A.

The Expansion of the Class of Persons Prohibited from
Taking Retaliatory Action

Unamended, SOX’s whistleblower protection provision
applies only to certain publicly traded companies.161 In applying
the statute’s plain meaning, courts have held that a narrow
reading—applying the provisions only to public companies—is
“necessary” to limit the scope of SOX’s antiretaliation
protection.162 Here courts have argued that a contrary holding
might have the effect of extending the statute “far beyond”
what Congress envisioned.163 Additionally, courts have held that
to subject nonpublic subsidiaries of publicly traded parent
companies to SOX’s whistleblower statute would “widen the
scope of the whistleblower protection provisions beyond what
Congress appears to have intended.”164 Congress, however, has
effectuated such intent through the Dodd-Frank Act. The
Dodd-Frank Act amended SOX’s antiretaliation provision,
which now provides that “any subsidiary or affiliate whose
financial information is included in the consolidated financial

161

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2006); see also Brady v. Calyon Sec. (USA), 406 F.
Supp. 2d 307, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that an employee of nonpublicly traded
companies was not covered by SOX and that a “specific requirement . . . is that
defendant be a publicly traded company”); Flake v. New World Pasta Co., 03-126, Final
Decision and Order (Dep’t of Labor Feb. 25, 2004) (concluding that pursuant to the
plain language of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, even when an employer is a publicly traded
company, it is not covered if it is not registered under section 12 or required to file
reports under section 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934).
162
Lawson v. FMR LLC, 724 F. Supp. 2d. 141, 155 (D. Mass. 2010) (citing
Goodman v. Decisive Analytics Corp., 2006 SOX 11 (Dep’t of Labor Jan. 10, 2006)).
163
Id. (quoting Goodman v. Decisive Analytics Corp., 2006 SOX 11 (Dep’t of
Labor Jan. 10, 2006)).
164
Malin v. Siemens Med. Solutions Health Servs., 638 F. Supp. 2d 492, 50001 (D. Md. 2008).
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statements”165 of a publicly traded company is prohibited from
taking discriminatory or retaliatory action against a
whistleblower-employee.166 Under this amendment, the scope of
SOX’s antiretaliation provision has been significantly
expanded, and now prohibits non-publicly traded subsidiaries
or affiliates of publicly traded companies from taking
discriminatory action against whistleblowers. Arguably, the
scope of persons prohibited from taking retaliatory action
under SOX is still restricted, as the statute applies only to
allegations of violations of securities regulations.167 In this
respect, the scope of SOX’s whistleblower provision may remain
limited. It is unlikely, however, that this “limitation” will ease
employers’ concerns, since individuals hoping to blow the
whistle on violations of regulations other than securities laws
can claim protection under a new antiretaliation statute
provided in section 1057 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which
implements a very broad antiretaliation provision.
The amended antiretaliation provision protects
whistleblowers from retaliation against “any person that
engages in offering or providing a consumer financial product
or service,”168 rather than to a narrow band of certain publicly
traded companies. The provision also broadly defines “financial
products or services” and includes appraisers, check cashers, and
lenders.169 Affiliates of financial service providers170 are also subject
165

Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929A, 124 Stat. 1376, 1852 (2010)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2011)) (emphasis
added).
166
Id.
167
Id. In Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc., the whistleblower-employee argued that
his employer, a privately held company, violated the antiretaliation provision. No. 10
Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47713, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). The
court, however, stated that “a specific requirement . . . is that defendant be a publicly
traded company.” Id. at *14 (quoting Brady v. Calyon Sec. (USA), 406 F. Supp. 2d 307,
317 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)). The plaintiff attempted to argue that the company was selling
securities and sought an initial public offering. Id. at *14-15. However, the court found
that the plaintiff “fail[ed] to identify the securities covered by the Exchange Act which
he claims [the defendant] sold. A mere allegation of an intention to sell securities,
without more, is not enough to turn a privately held company into a publicly traded
one.” Id. at *15.
168
12 U.S.C.A. § 5481(6)(A) (West 2001 & Supp. 2011).
169
The term “financial product or service,” in turn, includes extending credit;
appraising real and personal property, providing credit counseling, check cashing, and
real estate settlement services; and collecting or analyzing information “used in
connection with any decision regarding the offering or provision of a consumer financial
product or service . . . .” Id. § 5481(15)(A). The term “financial product or service” also
includes acting as a “custodian of funds or any financial instrument for use by or on
behalf of a consumer . . . providing financial advisory services . . . to consumers on
individual financial matters . . . [and] providing services to assist a consumer with debt
management or debt settlement . . . or avoiding foreclosure.” Id.

2011]

CORPORATE CORRUPTION

329

to SOX’s expanded laws, provided that the affiliate acts as a
“service provider,”171 or someone who furnishes a “material
service” to the financial service provider in connection with the
offering of a financial product or service. As a result, under the
Dodd-Frank Act’s amendment to SOX’s preexisting whistleblower
provisions, persons who provide or offer financial products or
services, and even those who may indirectly offer or provide
financial services, are subject to antiretaliation provisions.
This expansion of liability under the Dodd-Frank Act is
startling. Application of the preexisting statutes was limited to
cases of insider trading, tax evasion, fraudulent transactions with
the government, and those involving publicly traded companies.
Under section 1057, however, persons offering or providing
financial products or services to consumers, and even those who
provide a “material” service to such providers of financial
products or services, are subject to antiretaliation provisions.
The Bureau’s ability to insert additional examples and
definitions of “financial product or service” further evidences
the broad scope of the individuals and entities subject to
section 1057.172 If the Bureau concludes that a financial product
or service is executed with the purpose of evading any federal
consumer financial law, or is one that a bank or financial
holding company is permitted to offer and is likely to have a
material impact on consumers, the Bureau is explicitly
authorized to insert that product or service into the DoddFrank Act’s definition of “financial product or service.”173 The
scope of persons subject to section 1057’s prohibition against
retaliatory action is noninclusive and can be amended to
include other persons in the future, further expanding its
scope. The expanded protection that is now provided to
whistleblowers leads to increased employer liability, which can
have numerous negative effects like increased costs.174
170

Id. An affiliate is a person that “controls, is controlled by, or is under
common control with another person” of a person engaged in the offering or provision of
a consumer financial product or service. Id. § 5481(1), (6)(A).
171
Id. § 5481(26). The Dodd-Frank Act explicitly provides that the term
“service provider” is not to include a person who offers or provides to a covered person a
support service that is generally provided to businesses or a “similar ministerial
service,” id. § 5481(26)(B)(i), nor a person who provides “time or space for an
advertisement for a consumer financial product or service through print, newspaper, or
electronic media.” Id. § 5481(26)(B)(ii). Note that if the service provider offers or profits
from its own consumer financial product or service, it is deemed to be a covered person.
Id. § 5481(26)(C).
172
Id. § 5481(15)(A)(xi).
173
Id.
174
See infra Part IV.C.
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The Expansion of the Class of Persons Protected from
Retaliatory Action

The Dodd-Frank Act imprudently expands the class of
whistleblowers from the previously narrowly defined constraints
of the preexisting antiretaliation provisions to the current
definition protecting any whistleblower who performs tasks
“related” to “the offering or provision of a consumer financial
product or service.”175 The use of the broad, undefined term
“related” greatly increases the scope of antiretaliation protection
beyond what is appropriate to achieve congressional goals.
In addition, unlike SOX’s antiretaliation provision,
section 1057 is not limited to whistleblowers alleging certain
types of violations.176 Instead, legislators set section 1057’s
parameters broadly, and the statute explicitly applies to
whistleblowers who allege violations of any law subject to the
jurisdiction of the Bureau.177 The Bureau’s jurisdiction extends
to the regulation of the offering and provision of consumer
financial products or services under the federal consumer
financial laws, as well as all federal laws concerning public or
federal contracts, property, works, employees, budgets, or
funds.178 Protection from retaliation is no longer limited to
whistleblowers claiming violations of securities laws, tax codes,
or cases of insider trading. Rather, section 1057 significantly
expands the class of individuals protected under antiretaliation
laws.179 Due to the greater protection afforded to them,
whistleblowers now have additional incentives to blow the
whistle. The Dodd-Frank Act also increases employers’ liability

175

12 U.S.C.A. § 5567(b).
Section 1057 also protects authorized representatives of covered employees.
Id. § 5567(a). This is similar to SOX’s whistleblower provision, which protects
“employees” from retaliation. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a) (2006). Accordingly, an “employee”
includes a “company representative,” which is defined as “any officer, employee,
contractor, subcontractor, or agent of a company.” 29 C.F.R. § 1980.101 (2010).
177
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1057(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 2031
(2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5567(a)(1) (West 2001 & Supp. 2011)).
178
Id. § 1011(a), 124 Stat. at 1964.
179
Sections 748 and 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act amend the Commodity
Exchange Act and Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, respectively. The provisions
provide that no employer may discriminate or retaliate against an employee because of
the employee’s furnishing of information to either the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission or the SEC regarding the employer’s misconduct. Id. §§ 748(h)(1)(A),
922(h)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 1744, 1845. These provisions include additional classes of
individuals who are protected from retaliatory and discriminatory action, further
expanding the scope of whistleblower protection laws. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h) (West
2009 & Supp. 2011).
176
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to such provisions. This expansion of liability, however, is
likely to have damaging effects.
C.

The Negative Effects of Employers’ Expanded Liability
Under Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Protection Statutes

It is undeniable that antiretaliation laws justly protect
whistleblowers who report legitimate claims of employers’
violations. The positive effects of whistleblower protection laws,
however, do not justify the Dodd-Frank Act’s dramatic
expansion of liability under such provisions. Employers’
increased liability under the Dodd-Frank Act is likely to lead to
several damaging consequences. For instance, given the direct
costs associated with expanded corporate liability, such as
indemnity and defense costs,180 an increase in liability may
“affect the economy by influencing the behavior of individual
corporations.”181 It is likely that such expenses will increase as a
result of employers’ greater exposure to liability, thereby
impacting management decisions, including the cost-benefit
analyses associated with such decisions.182
Another cost that may result from the Dodd-Frank Act’s
whistleblower provisions is the “negative effect on
organizational culture.”183 Management shapes the ethical
nature of an organization, and by undermining management’s
internal compliance efforts, the whistleblower provisions are
“harming the organizational culture.”184 Further, “as
organizational culture affects organizational performance,
Dodd-Frank is harming the bottom line.”185 Other costs include
the damage to organizational reputation and a decrease in
shareholder wealth caused by SEC actions.186 Additionally,
employers may implement more stringent employment policies
in response to their increased liability.187 Although employers
may refrain from unjustly terminating competent employees as

180

PETER REUTER, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF EXPANDED CORPORATE
LIABILITY: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY v (1988) (examining the effects of expanded
liability in the context of wrongful termination).
181
Id. at vi.
182
Id. at v.
183
David Ebersole, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower
Provisions, 6 ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 123, 139 (2011).
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 139-40.
187
REUTER, supra note 180, at vi.
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a result of the employment policies,188 they may be hesitant to
terminate incompetent employees for fear of accusations of
violating antiretaliation laws.189 Consequently, there may be an
increase in the number of employees retained who in fact should
be terminated,190 and employers are likely to become “hampered
in their ability to adjust their employment levels
expeditiously.”191 Moreover, each new employee represents a
potential liability in the event of their termination,192 and thus
employers may incur greater expenditures for recruitment
efforts.193 The fear of wrongful termination actions can prevent
managers from “being as flexible in their response to changing
market conditions, risky investment opportunities, or technology
advances.”194 In effect, expanded exposure to liability may
prevent firms from making short-run adjustments in light of
business fluctuations.195 As a result, companies may increasingly
rely on overtime contractors or temporary agencies during
transition periods rather than permanent employees.196
The expanded protection granted to whistleblowers in
itself is arguably sufficient to encourage employees to report
violations, as it eliminates potential whistleblowers’ fears of
retaliation. But coupled with the excessive bounties offered to
whistleblowers under the Dodd-Frank Act, whistleblowers are
overincentivized, leading to more whistleblower reports197 and
burdening both employers and administrative agencies.
V.

SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR THE FUTURE

The ideal whistleblower provision is one that
“maximize[s] a potential informant’s discounted reward and
minimize[s] his discounted losses without making the mix so
attractive as to induce the disclosure of large amounts of bad
information.”198 The Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provisions,
188

Id.
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 22.
192
Id. at vii.
193
Id.
194
JAMES N. DERTOUZOS, ELAINE HOLLAND & PATRICIA EBENER, THE LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION 1 (1988).
195
Id.
196
Id. at 1-2.
197
The SEC has already reported a “surge in tips” since the passage of the
Dodd-Frank Act. See Holzer & Johnson, supra note 18.
198
Ferziger & Currell, supra note 99, at 1172. A whistleblower’s “discounted
gain” is the “amount [he] legitimately expects to receive, discounted by the likelihood
189
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however, fail to achieve this ideal balance. These provisions
overincentivize whistleblowing through their exorbitant bounty
payouts199 and expansive protection against retaliation.200
Whistleblowers need not overcome significant threshold
considerations to be eligible for the rewards, and these
employees are protected by the liberal interpretation of
antiretaliation provisions. Thus, risk is comparably low for
whistleblowers, but the potential reward is high. In such
circumstances, “most informants will come forward with even a
low level of certainty”201 and inundate government agencies
with trivial reports. In order to provide a more efficient and
effective means of policing employers through the use of
whistleblowers, Congress should ensure that the Dodd-Frank
Act’s whistleblower provision includes meaningful thresholds
that the whistleblower must overcome, lower rewards for the
whistleblower to recover, and appropriate penalties if the
whistleblower intentionally delays reporting a violation in
order to increase the amount of his reward.
A.

Implement Significant Threshold Considerations

In efforts to discourage whistleblowers from reporting
trivial claims, the Dodd-Frank Act should encourage
whistleblowers to report only those violations involving a
substantial amount of money.202 Although the Dodd-Frank Act
attempts to achieve this by requiring that the whistleblower’s
information lead to sanctions resulting in at least $1 million,203
this requirement alone is unlikely to prevent whistleblowers
from bringing forth insignificant claims. First, the rules now
provide that, “for the purposes of making an award, [the SEC]
will aggregate two or more smaller actions that arise from the
same nucleus of operative facts.”204 This is likely to lead to a
“just in case” mentality because a whistleblower may think
that the amount will be reduced or not awarded at all.” Id. at 1171. A whistleblower’s
“discounted losses” are the “potential losses discounted by the likelihood they will occur
at all.” Id.
199
See supra Part III.
200
See supra Part IV.
201
Ferziger & Currell, supra note 99, at 1180.
202
“[I]f a bounty program is to avoid” incentivizing citizens to “snitch on their
neighbors for insignificant transgressions and . . . the administrative costs attendant to
sifting through such bogus claims, it should encourage . . . informants to come forward
with information only when (1) the violation is factually and legally clear, and (2) it
involves a substantial quantity of money.” Id. at 1198.
203
See supra note 63.
204
SEC Final Rules, supra note 108, at 6-7.
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that another person is also reporting a violation that arises out
of the “same nucleus of operative facts.” Instead, the DoddFrank Act should impose additional threshold requirements.
One meaningful threshold is a requirement that
whistleblowers demonstrate the reasonable likelihood that the
alleged violation will result in sanctions of at least $1 million.
This requirement is not likely to be particularly cumbersome to
the potential whistleblower, as an informant is
able to cheaply discover the maximum and minimum awards for
which he is potentially eligible, and, unlike an agency, he may know
approximately how much is at stake in the potential litigation.
Based on this nonpublic information, an informant should be able to
estimate with some accuracy whether the government is likely to
recover a penalty from the defendant.205

This requirement would discourage whistleblowers from
reporting trivial claims “just in case” they lead to sanctions of
over $1 million, thereby reducing administrative costs.206 One
might argue that there is a threshold consideration in the
Dodd-Frank Act. The final rules define a whistleblower as one
who “possess[es] a reasonable belief that the information [he or
she is] providing relates to a possible securities law
violation . . . that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to
occur.”207 Thus, although there is no standard that the
whistleblower must meet regarding whether or not the claim
will meet the $1 million minimum, there is arguably a
threshold consideration as the alleged violation must be a
“possible” violation. However, in its letter to the SEC, Jones
Day provided an example of where a “literally true statement
might relate to a potential violation but not to an actual
205

Ferziger & Currell, supra note 99, at 1183-84.
Commentators advocated for including a standard of reasonableness in the
definition of a “whistleblower.” Some recommended that an individual have a
“reasonable” or “good faith belief” that the information he or she possesses relates to a
securities law violation. See Jones Day Letter, supra note 109, at 2-3; Letter from
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
at 3 (Dec. 17, 2010) (on file with author) (suggesting a requirement for both a
subjective and objectively reasonable belief of a violation); Letter from Ronald C. Long,
Dir. Regulatory Affairs, Wells Fargo, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, at 3 (Dec. 17, 2010) (noting that defining whistleblowers as individuals who
provide information regarding “‘potential violations’ without any threshold defining
criteria or good faith standard would only serve to frustrate the effective and efficient
administration of genuine whistleblower claims”). The SEC, however, commented that
“a higher standard requiring a ‘probable’ or ‘likely’ violation is unnecessary, and would
make it difficult for the staff to promptly assess whether to accord whistleblower status
to a submission.” SEC Final Rules, supra note 108, at 13.
207
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2 (2010).
206
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violation.”208 For instance, Jones Day presents a scenario where
a company’s Chief Financial Officer makes optimistic
statements about the company’s prospects. At the end of the
financial quarter, however, the company reports disappointing
results and the company’s stock falls. An employee of the
company then blows the whistle and alleges that prior to
making the optimistic statements, the Chief Financial Officer
made statements during an internal meeting suggesting the
company faced “significant challenges.”209 Jones Day notes that
the contrast between the negative internal statements and the
more optimistic statements may suggest a potential violation of
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.210 The
whistleblower-employee, however, knows the full context of the
internal statements and in what respects the company faced
such challenges. Thus, the full context of the internal
statements makes it apparent that the Chief Financial Officer
has not engaged in any misrepresentation. In this scenario, the
whistleblower-employee’s allegation is “literally true, and it
relates to a possible violation of the securities laws; but even if
[the whistleblower-employee] acted in bad faith, she is
absolutely protected in her employment due to the [SEC’s]
expansion of the definition of a ‘whistleblower’ to include
information relating to ‘potential’ violations.”211 In this respect,
the fact that the SEC requires whistleblowers to bring claims
regarding “possible” violations will not likely serve as a
meaningful threshold consideration.
An additional threshold that legislators should
implement is a requirement that whistleblowers first report
the alleged discrepancy to employers’ internal compliance
systems. Only if the issue is not resolved may the
whistleblower resort to government assistance. For instance, a
208
209
210

Jones Day Letter, supra note 109, at 3.
Id.
Id. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that it is

unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange [t]o effect a short sale . . . [and] [t]o use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on
a national securities exchange or any security not so registered . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
211
Jones Day Letter, supra note 109, at 3.

336

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

provision similar to section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act
would provide a more “logical whistleblowing framework.”212
Under section 10A, auditors who believe they have discovered
an illegal act at a company are required to report it first to
company management and the audit committee.213 If the
company fails to take remedial action, only then is the auditor
required to report the violation to the SEC.214 As it stands now,
the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provision is likely to
“reverse a decade of effort promoting integrity, selfremediation, and corporate self-reporting.”215 Requiring
whistleblowers to report first through companies’ internal
compliance systems would provide senior management with
the opportunity to remedy the alleged violation, and avoid
employees’ circumvention of internal compliance programs.216
The finalized rules provide that a whistleblower’s reward may
be increased if he or she utilizes the internal compliance
system.217 However, as displayed in Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc.,
this might not always be the most effective means of
encouraging whistleblowers to use internal compliance
programs.218 Under the Egan Court’s interpretation, the DoddFrank Act’s whistleblower provision requires whistleblowers to
report to the SEC in order to receive both protection against
retaliation219 and their monetary reward.220 As a result, it is
212

Carton, supra note 107 (quoting former SEC enforcement attorney, Jacob
Frenkel, and providing that “absent egregious misconduct condoned (or even
conducted) by senior management, employees have a responsibility to attempt to
correct errors and misconduct through existing corporate compliance systems”).
213
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b)(1) (“If, in the course of conducting an audit . . . the
registered public accounting firm detects . . . an illegal act . . . the firm shall . . . inform
the appropriate level of the management of the issuer and assure that the audit
committee of the issuer . . . is adequately informed with respect to illegal acts that have
been detected.”).
214
Id. § 78j-1(b)(2). “If . . . the registered public accounting firm concludes
that . . . the senior management has not taken . . . timely and appropriate remedial
actions with respect to the illegal act . . . the registered public accounting firm shall, as
soon as practicable, directly report its conclusions to the board of directors.” Id. Once
the issuer’s board of directors receives the report, it must “inform the [SEC] by notice
not later than 1 business day after the receipt of such report and shall furnish the
registered public accounting firm making such report with a copy of the notice
furnished to the [SEC].” Id. § 78j-1(b)(3).
215
Carton, supra note 107 (quoting former SEC enforcement attorney, Jacob
Frenkel).
216
See supra Part III.C.3.
217
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-4(c), 240.21F-6(a)(4) (2010).
218
See supra Part III.C.
219
Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
47713, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
220
Id. at *24 (“Obviously, a whistleblower must directly report to the SEC to
receive a bounty award from the SEC . . . .”).
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likely that whistleblowers will bypass internal compliance
programs. The SEC states that “internal investigations can be
an important component of corporate compliance . . . [but]
providing information to persons conducting an internal
investigation, or simply being contacted by them, may not,
without more, achieve the statutory purpose of getting highquality, original information about securities violations directly
into the hands of [SEC] staff.”221 However, Congress should
implement a program that replicates the auditing system
where the whistleblower first reports the violation internally,
and receives protection from retaliation, and then reports it to
the SEC if a certain period of time passes and no remedial
action has been taken. Such a reporting system would avoid
the eradication of companies’ internal compliance programs
and mitigate the issue of threshold considerations,222 thereby
encouraging only those who have nontrivial claims to come
forward.
B.

Reduce the Amount of the Mandated Bounties Awarded
to Eligible Whistleblowers

Legislators should also reduce the amount of the
mandated reward given to eligible whistleblowers. The imposition
of high monetary rewards for violations involving high levels of
moral
outrage
is
unnecessary
and
overincentivizes
223
whistleblowing. Instead, a low, fixed-percentage award provides
the best route.224 Although a low bounty may affect potential
whistleblowers’ decisions to report alleged violations, a lower
reward is not likely to affect whistleblowers’ decisions to report
cases of serious infractions.225 Instead, a low bounty’s most
profound effect will likely be limited to whistleblowers’ decisions
to expose cases involving “insignificant” fraud.226 Even if the
bounties offered under the Dodd-Frank Act were limited to 5

221

SEC Final Rules, supra note 108, at 34.
Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of
Overlapping Obligations, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 433, 463 (2009).
223
See supra Part III.B.
224
Ferziger & Currell, supra note 99, at 1197. The authors also propose that
the ideal whistleblower bounty provision “guarantee[s] that (1) the maximum allowable
bounty will always be paid where an agency recovers a penalty based on an informant’s
tip, and (2) the agency will make all possible efforts to maintain an informant’s
anonymity within the constraints of the litigation process.” Id.
225
Id. at 1198.
226
Id.
222
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percent of sanctions exceeding $1 million, this would guarantee a
minimum payment of $50,000—hardly an insignificant amount.
C.

Penalize Whistleblowers Who Intentionally Delay
Reporting the Alleged Violation

Another concern implicated by the Dodd-Frank Act’s
whistleblower provision is the fear that whistleblowers may
intentionally delay reporting violations to increase the amount
of the resulting sanctions, thereby increasing the amount of
their reward. To discourage such behavior, lawmakers should
penalize whistleblowers who unreasonably delay reporting the
illegality. Research has indicated that penalties are not always
effective in inducing action.227 Thus, if such a penalty were
imposed, it should be implemented only in limited circumstances
where the employer demonstrates that the whistleblower
unreasonably delayed reporting the violation with the clear
intent to increase the amount of his reward or to increase his
chances of satisfying the Dodd-Frank Act’s $1 million minimum.
The use of a penalty in limited circumstances may prevent
whistleblowers’ fraudulent behavior while minimizing the
negative sociological effects of penalties.
Arguably, whistleblowers are penalized under DoddFrank if they attempt to undermine the integrity of internal
compliance systems. The SEC provides that a whistleblower’s
attempts to undermine the company’s internal compliance
program can decrease the amount of an award.228 However, the
mere diminution of an award will not be sufficient to deter
people from acting in this manner. The Dodd-Frank Act
whistleblower provisions were implemented in hopes to
“promote effective enforcement of federal securities laws by
providing incentives for persons with knowledge of misconduct
to come forward and share their information with the [SEC].”229
If, however, a whistleblower takes “any steps to undermine the
integrity of . . . [employers’ internal compliance] systems or
processes,”230 his or her reward is merely reduced rather than
eliminated, and this contradicts the goals of the provisions.
Instead, elimination of the reward is a better option.

227
228
229
230

Feldman & Lobel, supra note 85, at 1181.
SEC Final Rules, supra note 108, at 5; 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(b)(3) (2010).
SEC Final Rules, supra note 108, at 34.
Id.
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CONCLUSION
Drafters of the Dodd-Frank Act attempted to cure the
defects that many alleged were the contributing factors to the
2008 financial crisis, including regulatory failure.231
Commentators, however, have noted that “reform is premature
when the exact nature and causes of the financial crisis are yet
to be determined.”232 Legislators, without fully knowing the
extent and precise causes of the financial crisis, implemented
provisions calling for comprehensive regulatory reform233 and
created a broad whistleblower provision within the Dodd-Frank
Act. As a result, the Dodd-Frank Act fails to provide an
effective whistleblower program, and instead overincentivizes
whistleblowing through its expansive whistleblower protection
and excessive bounties. Instead, legislators should carefully
examine the incentives and consequences of whistleblowing
and draft a provision that reflects those findings accordingly.
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